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A WASTE OF JUDICIAL AND AGENCY RESOURCES-THE
FAA'S PAINSTAKING COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATIONS
GOVERNING THE HANGAR 24 PROJECT
LAuRA L. ARBEITER*
CAFEGUARDING THE HISTORIC Hanscom Area's Irreplaceable
AResources, Inc. v. FAA concerns conservationist organizations'
and concerned citizens' unsuccessful challenge of the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA's) approval of a demolition and
rebuilding project at a Massachusetts airport.' The First Circuit
held that the FAA's findings and decision to sanction the project
clearly complied with the Department of Transportation Act
(DOT Act), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).2 The FAA's ful-
fillment of its responsibilities under the applicable statutes dem-
onstrates the necessity for a more streamlined challenge process
that prevents wasteful use of judicial resources.
The dispute at issue arose when the Massachusetts Port Au-
thority (Massport) began developing a plan to modernize Lau-
rence G. Hanscom Field (Hanscom), a "general aviation
airport" located in Bedford, Massachusetts, near a plethora of
"historically significant sites."' Massport, an entity affiliated with
the Massachusetts state government, requested FAA authoriza-
tion of a project that included "demolition of an existing hangar
and . . . development of a state-of-the-art fixed base operator
(FBO) facility."4 An FBO facility helps deliver a variety of ser-
vices for aircraft, operators, and passengers, such as "mainte-
nance, fueling, parking, and hangaring" for the aircraft, "flight
* J.D. Candidate 2014, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law;
B.A. from Texas A&M University, 2011. The author would like to thank her
family and friends for their love and support.
1 651 F.3d 202 (1st Cir. 2011); see Why It Matters, SHHAIR, http://www.shhair.
org/whyitmatters.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2013).
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planning services" for pilots, and "ground transportation or
overnight accommodations" for passengers.' At the time the
case was decided, Hanscom operated as a "relief valve" for the
main airport in the Boston area, Logan International Airport
(Logan); this allowed Logan to focus on providing "large-scale
commercial flights" while Hanscom offered services such as pilot
training and other aviation operations for corporations, institu-
tions, and individuals.'
Here, the debate concerning the modernization of Hanscom
revolved largely around Hangar 24, a structure that had been a
part of the airport since 1948, had been deemed "unsuitable"
for use as a research facility by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in 2001, and had been vacant since that determina-
tion was made.' After requesting proposals for the redevelop-
ment of the Hangar 24 site in 2005, Massport selected a project
that would replace Hangar 24 with an FBO facility.' This deci-
sion caused concerned citizens and preservationist groups to
mobilize against the project.' One organization, Save Our Heri-
tage, contacted the Massachusetts Historical Commission (Com-
mission) in 2006 and requested that it evaluate Hangar 24 for
potential addition to the National Register of Historic Places
(National Register)." The Commission determined that Hangar
24 met two of the necessary criteria because the structure was
associated with "significant historical events" and "the lives of
historically significant persons."" As a result, Massport initiated
studies that analyzed the hangar's current condition and poten-
tial for alternative uses.12 One study conducted by an aviation
consultant, HNTB Corporation, "found [the hangar] 'function-
ally obsolete' and unsuitable for aviation use"; another study
found the hangar unfit for use by the Massachusetts Air and
Space Museum."
In 2008, per the regulatory framework requiring the FAA to
"ensure the safety, security, and efficiency" of airport facilities,
5 Respondent's Answering Brief at 2, Safeguarding, 651 F.3d 202 (No. 10-1972).
6 Safeguarding, 651 F.3d at 206; Respondent's Answering Brief, supra note 5, at
7-8.
7 Safeguarding, 651 F.3d at 206.
8 Id.; Respondent's Answering Brief, supra note 5, at 9.
9 Safeguarding, 651 F.3d at 205.
10 Id. at 206.
1I Id.; see 36 C.F.R. § 60.4(a)-(b) (2012).
12 Safeguarding, 651 F.3d at 206.
13 Id.
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the FAA began the approval process for the Hangar 24 project.1 4
In 2010, the FAA approved the replacement of Hangar 24 after
"engag[ing] in a consultation process and prepar[ing] an envi-
ronmental assessment (EA)" that focused on the project's po-
tential impacts on the environment and historic landmarks.1 5
Specifically, the FAA determined that the Hangar 24 project
complied with the requirements set forth by the DOT Act, the
NHPA, and the NEPA.11 Disagreeing with each of these determi-
nations, the petitioners filed an action for judicial review under
49 U.S.C. § 46110, challenging the FAA's order allowing the
Hangar 24 project to proceed."
In short, the First Circuit upheld the FAA's findings and de-
nied the petitioners' request for judicial review because the FAA
adequately complied with the regulatory framework set out by
the statutes and regulations governing this case." With respect
to the standard of review, the court was required to "uphold the
FAA's findings of fact as long as they [were] supported by sub-
stantial evidence"; the agency's actions could be set aside only if
they were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law."' In other words, the FAA's
order could be set aside if it depended on improper factors, ne-
glected to consider relevant aspects of the issue, presented a ra-
tionale that contradicted the available evidence, or "reached a
conclusion so implausible that it [could not] be attributed to a
difference of opinion or the application of agency expertise.""
The court upheld the FAA's order for the following reasons: (1)
the Hangar 24 project was the "only feasible and prudent alter-
native" under the DOT Act; (2) replacing the hangar would
have no adverse consequence under an interpretation of the
NHPA; and (3) the project posed no significant impact within
the meaning of the NEPA.m
The court first addressed the petitioners' argument that the
FAA's findings failed to comply with Section 4(f) of the DOT
14 Id. at 206-07, 214; see also Exec. Order No. 13,180, 65 Fed. Reg. 77,493 (Dec.
7, 2000), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,264, 67 Fed. Reg. 39,243 (June 7, 2002).
16 Safeguarding, 651 F.3d at 207.
16 Id. at 205, 207.
17 Id. at 207; see generally 49 U.S.C. § 46110 (2006).
18 Safeguarding, 651 F.3d at 218.
19 Id. at 207 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)).
20 Id. (quoting Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st
Cir. 1997)).
21 See id. at 207, 218.
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Act, which limits the use of land listed in the National Register. 2 2
The FAA may approve a transportation project involving the use
of historically significant lands only if "there is no prudent and
feasible alternative to using that land . . . [and] the program or
project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to the
. I . historic site."2 ' The EA that was prepared in conjunction
with the Hangar 24 project took four alternative courses of ac-
tion into consideration: (1) "[d]o nothing"; (2) "[l]ocate a new
hangar facility elsewhere on the airport"; (3) adapt and reuse
Hangar 24; or (4) "[r]eplace Hangar 24 as proposed by Mass-
port."2 4 The FAA determined that while each alternative was fea-
sible, only Massport's proposal of replacing Hangar 24 was
prudent.2 5 The First Circuit rejected the petitioners' argument
based on Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,26 which
suggests that an alternative is only imprudent if it presents "'ex-
traordinary costs,'" disruptions, or other "'unique problems.' "27
Analyzing each alternative, the court first held that the FAA's
rejection of the "do nothing" option was neither arbitrary nor
capricious because this proposal would fail to support Mass-
port's goal of meeting a proven increased demand for aviation
services at Hanscom.2" This conclusion rested partly on First Cir-
cuit precedent that "'an alternative is not prudent if it does not
meet the transportation needs of a project.' "2 Next, the court
addressed the possibility of locating the FBO facility in the only
other available site at Hanscom: the East Ramp."o The FAA ulti-
mately determined that Hangar 24 was the more prudent option
because the East Ramp location posed complications such as dis-
tance from other airport facilities, access problems, property
rights issues, and potential environmental impacts." The peti-
tioners attacked this determination as vague and unsubstanti-
ated, but the court upheld the FAA'.s "judgment call" as "within
22 Id. at 207; see also Petitioners' Opening Brief at 28, Safeguarding, 651 F.3d 202
(No. 10-1972).
23 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2006).
24 FAA, DRArr ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 5 (2008), available at http://www.
massport.com/in-the-community/pages/communityaffairsnotices.aspx.
25 Safeguarding, 651 F.3d at 208.
26 401 U.S. 402 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430
U.S. 99 (1977).
27 Safeguarding, 651 F.3d at 208 (quoting Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 413).
28 Id. at 209-10.
29 Id. at 209 (quoting Neighborhood Ass'n of the Back Bay, Inc. v. Fed. Transit
Admin., 463 F.3d 50, 65 (1st Cir. 2006)).
30 Id. at 210-11.
31 Id.
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the purview of the FAA's expertise" and compliant with the re-
quirements set forth by 49 U.S.C. § 47101 (a)." Furthermore,
the court held that the petitioners' broad attack did not amount
to the "'sustained and organized rebuttal"' required to defeat
the FAA's factor analysis." Finally, the court upheld the FAA's
rejection of adapting Hangar 24 for use within the FBO facility
because the totality of factors inhibiting ease of adaptation justi-
fied the FAA's finding. 4
After determining that replacing Hangar 24 was the only pru-
dent option, the First Circuit held that the proposed project in-
cluded all possible planning to minimize harm within the
meaning of Section 4(f) of the DOT Act. 5 The court noted that
the FAA's decision that a proposed project "sufficiently mini-
mizes the likely harms to historic properties" merits "'even
greater deference"' than a determination concerning feasible
and prudent alternatives." Furthermore, the FAA was only re-
quired to consider harm-minimizing actions that were "feasible
and prudent under existing circumstances."" The court ruled
that the FAA's analysis met this standard.
The First Circuit next rejected the petitioners' argument that
the FAA failed to comply with procedures required by the
NHPA."9 Because Hangar 24 fell within Section 106 of the
NHPA due to its inclusion in the National Register, the FAA was
obligated to (1) determine whether the project was an "under-
taking" that could affect historic property; (2) consult with the
Commission to ascertain and resolve potential effects; (3) notify
the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (Council) of the
issue; and (4) implement a memorandum of agreement (MOA)
once all parties settled on a method of resolving the potential
effects.4 0 Here, the FAA determined the project to be an "under-
32 Id. at 211: see 49 U.S.C. § 47101 (a) (1), (7) (2006) (mandating that "the safe
operation of the airport . . . system is the highest aviation priority" and that "air-
port . . . projects that increase the capacity of facilities . . . be undertaken to the
maximum feasible extent so that safety and efficiency increase and delays
decrease").
3 Safeguarding, 651 F.3d at 211 (quoting Save Our Heritage, Inc. v. FAA, 269
F.3d 49, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)).
34 Id. at 211-13.
3 Id. at 213-14.
36 Id. at 213 (quoting Conservation Law Found. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 24
F.3d 1465, 1476-77 (1st Cir. 1994)).
3 Id.
38 Id. at 213-14.
3 Id. at 216-17.
40 Id. at 214; see 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2006); 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.3-800.6 (2012).
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taking" and began consulting with the Commission. 4 ' The FAA
then released a draft EA for public comment, and following the
Council's determination that its involvement was unnecessary
due to the FAA's "exhaustive" consideration of alternatives, the
FAA issued a draft MOA detailing its pledge to mitigate effects. 4 2
The court refused the petitioners' arguments that the project
was too ambiguous to assess, that historic sites other than Han-
gar 24 would be affected, that scenic views would be altered, that
the project posed a fire hazard, and that it would significantly
increase noise levels. 3
Finally, the First Circuit.dismissed the petitioners' critique of
the FAA's compliance with the NEPA, which "requires federal
agencies to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS)
for 'major [flederal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment.'" 44 However, if an agency issues an EA
and determines that a more detailed EIS is unnecessary, "it may
issue an explained finding of no significant impact."4 5 Here, the
petitioners' challenge under the NEPA concentrated on the
FAA's finding that the project's potential increase in cumulative
noise levels would be minimal. 6 The court rejected this argu-
ment, concluding that the FAA's analysis was conducted in a rea-
sonable manner and its results could not be challenged.4 7
This case presented an ideal opportunity for the First Circuit
to initiate a discussion about how to remedy the inefficient state
of the review process for FAA findings. The court, however,
failed to act on this opportunity. Where, as here, the FAA ap-
pears to have gone above and beyond what is required by the
review process, judicial resources are squandered by such an ex-
tensive review of the administrative record and FAA actions.
Though any possible solution is bound to present additional
hurdles, Congress, the FAA, and other appropriate agencies
should work together to reform the process through which con-
cerned citizens challenge FAA decisions. Reform efforts could
focus on restructuring the public comment process and encour-
aging greater third-party involvement in the assessment of pro-
posed projects.
41 Safeguarding, 651 F.3d at 214.
42 Id. at 215.
4 Id. at 215-16.
44 Id. at 217-18 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006)).
5 Id. at 217; see 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(c), (e) (2012).
46 Safeguarding, 651 F.3d at 217-18.
4 Id.
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The role of the public comment period should be expanded
to more effectively resolve citizens' concerns. The NHPA, the
NEPA, and the DOT Act all contain similar provisions requiring
an agency to "provide an opportunity for members of the public
to express their views on resolving adverse effects of the under-
taking."4 8 Additionally, in an action for judicial review of an FAA
order, a court may only consider objections previously raised in
a proceeding conducted by the Under Secretary of Transporta-
tion or the FAA Administrator-unless reasonable grounds for
the lack of previous objections exist." These provisions demon-
strate a commitment to public involvement, but this commit-
ment should be taken a step further to prevent needless
litigation and judicial review. While these regulations do not re-
quire public hearings in addition to a public comment period,"
a mandatory public hearing held subsequent to the distribution
of the draft EA, MOA, and potential EIS could require con-
cerned parties to raise all objections at that time. A final ruling
on each concern could be issued by a representative from the
Council, the DOT, or other agency. The appeals process would
therefore become more streamlined by relying on these discus-
sions and rulings.
Another potential resolution involves mandatory assessment
of the project by a neutral third party and deference to its con-
clusion. For instance, in Safeguarding, the FAA could have relied
on an aviation consultant like HNTB Corporation to establish
certain indisputable findings. A neutral third party's involve-
ment would simply function as an extension of the provision en-
couraging individuals with a "demonstrated interest in the
undertaking" to consult with the agency in its decision making
process.
The FAA is required to abide by an assortment of statutes and
regulations in the process of approving an airport project.
These regulations include, but are not limited to, the DOT Act,
the NHPA, and the NEPA. The FAA should not be punished
with extended litigation after it has carefully complied with the
requirements set forth in such statutes. Therefore, reform of the
- 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(a)(4) (2012); see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (revealing the
NEPA's commitment to public involvement in agency statements); 49 U.S.C.
§ 303(c)-(d) (2006) (demonstrating that the DOT Act incorporates the public
comment requirements stated under the NHPA).
4 49 U.S.C. § 46110(d).
50 See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C); 49 U.S.C. § 303(c)-(d); 36 C.F.R. § 800.6(a) (4).
51 See 36 C.F.R. § 800.2(c) (5).
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review process for FAA findings is critical to improving the effi-
cient operation of the FAA, other agencies, and the judicial
system.
